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How technological change affects power relations in global markets: remote developers in 
the console and mobile games industry 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on Australian development firms in the console and mobile games 
industry in order to understand how small firms in a geographically remote and marginal 
position in the global industry are able to relate to global firms and capture revenue share. 
This paper shows that while technological change in the games industry has resulted in the 
emergence of new industry segments based on transactional rather than relational forms of 
economic coordination, in which we might therefore expect less asymmetrical power 
relations, lead firms retain a position of power in the global games entertainment industry 
relative to remote developers. This has been possible because lead firms in the emerging 
mobile devices market have developed and sustained bottlenecks in their segment of the 
industry through platform competition and the development of an intensely competitive 
ecosystem of developers. Our research shows the critical role of platform competition and 
bottlenecks in influencing power asymmetries within global markets. Keywords global value 
chains, market power, platform competition, standards competition, small and medium 
sized enterprises   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Power relations in global value chains can be disrupted by technological advances 
that can affect industry architectures and modes of economic coordination (Dedrick et al, 
2010; Gereffi et al, 2005; Jacobides et al, 2006; Sturgeon, 2002). The introduction of new 
technology can drive the evolution of value chains through the development of industry 
standards and modularization, which increase the capacity of firms to switch between 
partners, particularly where they previously depended on deep repeat relations with a 
narrow range of co-specializers in order to facilitate complex information exchange and 
tailoring of product designs (Sturgeon, 2009). Standards competition can also lead to 
platform wars whereby platform holders seek to increase their bargaining power by 
developing an ecosystem of complementors whose products and services utilize their 
standards and enhance the value of their platform (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; Tee and 
Gawer, 2009).   As such, technological innovation is potentially disruptive to industry 
architectures and forms of economic coordination that affect power relations in global 
markets, creating the possibility for firms to maneuver to achieve architectural advantages, 
or to increase bargaining power in the changing industry (Dedrick et al, 2010; Gereffi et al, 
2005; Jacobides et al, 2006; Pisano and Teece, 2007).   
The games industry is experiencing massive technological change. It is the largest 
entertainment industry globally generating more revenue than film and music with 
successful console games titles individually producing over $US1 billion in revenue (Rose, 
2011). The video or console game market revenue was $US18.58 billion in 2010 (Fieldman, 
2011).  The console component of the games industry is heavily concentrated in regional 
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markets in the USA, Japan and Europe with console manufacturers and publishers at the 
centre of the value chain forming deep repeat relations with publishers and developers 
(Johns, 2006; Kerr, 2006). Console manufacturers hold a very strong position of power at the 
centre of the console games value chain (Johns, 2006) with small and medium sized (SME) 
games developers finding it difficult to break into the global market and connect with 
publishers and manufacturers. 
It is estimated that the mobile game industry will reach $US11.4 billion in revenue by 
2014. The storage and distribution of entertainment products through digital formats as 
well as the development of new devices, particularly smartphones, has resulted in direct 
access to on-line distribution channels for games developers. This could provide a basis for 
the development of relatively equal power relations, given the codification of information 
exchange and the transactional nature of governance in these emerging markets (Gereffi et 
al, 2005). The games industry therefore provides a basis for analyzing whether technology is 
driving a shift from global value chains (GVCs) in which TNCs occupy positions of power 
relative to regionally located SMEs towards forms of economic coordination involving arms-
length relations that elevate the power of suppliers and break down existing patterns of 
spatial concentration.  
This paper focuses on the games industry in Australia in order to understand how 
small firms in a geographically remote and marginal position in the global industry are able 
to relate to global firms and capture revenue share. As will be shown, the Australian 
industry provides a context for understanding how the emergence of markets for mobile 
games has created new opportunities and constraints for developers in locations outside 
the centre of activity of the console industry in Japan, Europe and the USA and affected 
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power relations in a relatively small and geographically remote segment of the industry. The 
paper shows that while industry architectures and governance arrangements in the growing 
industry for mobile games differ from those in the console value chain, the new 
arrangements have created a different basis for unequal bargaining power for small remote 
developers, rather than a reconstruction of power relations in markets in which these firms 
participate.  
 
THE DYNAMICS OF COORDINATION MECHANISMS AND POWER RELATIONS IN GLOBAL 
MARKETS 
 
In seeking to understand forms of economic coordination and power relations in industry 
segments in which games developers operate, this paper draws on both global value chain 
(GVC) analysis and the growing literature on industry architectures and platform 
competition.  Both of these literatures are concerned with issues relating to the 
organization of industrial activity and the distribution of value associated with the way in 
which industrial activity is arranged (Gereffi et al, 2005; Jacobides et al, 2006; Porter, 1985; 
Williamson, 1975); or what Tee and Gawer (2009, page  ? ? ? ) ŚĂǀĞ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ǁŚŽ
ĚŽĞƐ ǁŚĂƚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ǁŚŽ ŐĞƚƐ ǁŚĂƚ ? ŽĨ ŐůŽďĂů ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ? This paper draws primarily on global 
value chain analysis, rather than the broader GPN (global production network) analysis 
(Henderson et al, 2002; Levy, 2008), because the paper is concerned with the impact of 
technological changes and the development of standards, which has been discussed most 
explicitly within the GVC approach, as a source of power in global markets (Gereffi et al, 
2005; Hess and Coe, 2006; Nadvi, 2008; Sturgeon, 2002).  However, we draw on insights, 
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particularly regarding power and network embeddedness, that have been developed in 
prior studies of entertainment industries utilizing a GPN approach (Johns, 2006)1.  
A central project of GVC analysis is to identify powerful economic actors and explain 
the source of their power and its connection with the geographical distribution of economic 
activity (Özatagan, 2011; Rutherford and Holmes, 2008; Sturgeon, 2009, page 128).  A key 
contribution of GVC analysis is its explication of the varieties of forms of network 
governance that sit between hierarchies and markets as forms of economic coordination 
that incorporate varying degrees of power asymmetry (Bair, 2009; Sturgeon, 2009). In 
earlier approaches, these arrangements were conceptualized as either producer-driven or 
buyer-driven. In the GVC analysis, producer-driven chains have been dissected into modular 
and relational forms, while buyer-driven networks are akin to captive value chains 
(Sturgeon, 2009).  
In relational value chains, in which the ability to codify information is limited, trust 
based social relations form the basis for more equitable power relations and are the 
necessary mechanism to avoid the opportunistic behaviors that are possible in the presence 
of complementarity (or highly tailored products and high mutual dependence) (Sturgeon, 
2002). Co-located buyers and highly competent suppliers engage in sustained relationships 
underpinned by trust and tacit knowledge exchange, such as those identified in segments of 
the fresh produce markets in which UK retailers have formed close relations with fresh 
produce exporters from Kenya in order to facilitate coordination of imports according to 
intensifying quality and time pressures (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). Relational value chains 
                                                 
1
 Advocates for the adoption of a GPN approach have criticised GVC analysis for its relatively narrow focus on 
inter-firm governance, to the neglect of institutional and political governance of markets and broader 
conceptions of power and embeddedness (Coe et al, 2008). Sturgeon (2009) acknowledges the tendency for 
GVC analysis to focus on transaction-cost-based approaches, which emphasize issues of industrial 
organization. For a discussion on the similarities and distinctions between these approaches see Bair (2009).  
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ĚĞƉĞŶĚŚĞĂǀŝůǇŽŶĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐhǌǌŝ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ
the New York garment industry illustrates (Uzzi, 1997).  
Importantly, relational value chains are more likely to be associated with spatial 
concentration, given that the development of deep relations depends on repeat 
transactions and typically face to face knowledge and information exchange as has been 
depicted in relation to the creative industries (Grabher, 2002; Scott, 2006). Cultural 
indƵƐƚƌŝĞƐĂƌĞǀŝĞǁĞĚĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĂ ‘ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽĐůƵƐƚĞƌŝŶƚŝŐŚƚĂŐŐůŽŵĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝzed 
ďǇ ŝŶƚĞŶƐĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ?ŽůĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ?page 892).  Within creative industries, trust is 
frequently operationalized as reputation, a major intangible resource of firms that provides 
information about the dependability of firms to deliver value; that is, high quality products 
within the time frames promised and within budget (Scott and Pope, 2007).  
However, prior studies of the geography of entertainment industries, drawing on 
global production network (GPN) analysis, place less emphasis on physical distance (Johns, 
2006) in recognition that firms function within global networks of value creation in which 
relations and connectivity to others are best understood in terms of network 
embeddedness. As Henderson et al (2002, page 453) explain;  ‘GPNs are characterized not 
only by their territorial embeddedness, but also by the connections between network 
members regardless of their country of origin or local anchoring in particular places ?. In the 
case of the Vancouver film industry, Coe (2000; 2001) and Coe and Johns (2004) have 
reported on the critical role of extra-local network linkages for accessing work and financing 
of film production, along with the local face to face interactions associated with the 
production process. In another example demonstrating the importance of non-local 
network linkages, Cole (2008) found that European animation firms were able to cooperate 
ǁŚŝůĞ ďĞŝŶŐ ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůůǇ ĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĞĚ ? ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ƐƉĂƚŝĂůůǇ ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ĞĐŽůŽŐǇ ? ?
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These spatially extended links allowed access to financing and distribution that was not 
available in local production centres. However, whether ties are concentrated in spatial or 
relational networks, there is little debate about the fundamental characteristics of relational 
value chains in these industries, which depend on deep repeat relations that facilitate the 
exchange of complex information during the creative design process and which are 
underpinned by trust in the sense of reliability for delivery on time and within budget (Coe 
and Johns, 2004; Scott and Pope, 2007). 
Technological change, and the development of standards in particular, potentially 
impacts on the nature and importance of these spatial and network relations. Standards 
have played an important role in the analysis of how global markets are organized as 
standards potentially reduce transaction costs by enabling the codification of otherwise 
highly complex information (Nadvi, 2008; Sturgeon, 2002). In modular value chains, 
standards have facilitated the exchange of codified information on component, product and 
process requirements, which in industries such as electronics has replaced previously 
existing social relations with more arms-length forms of economic coordination. This 
potentially impacts ŽŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐǁŝƚĐŚŝŶŐ ?ƉŽǁĞƌ ŽĨďƵǇĞƌƐĂŶĚ ?Žƌ ƐĞůůĞƌƐ ?who may be better 
able to switch between potential buyers/suppliers than when they were embedded in 
relational value chains (Sturgeon, 2002; 2009). In such cases, the development of standards 
has reduced the level of asset specificity, which involved the tailoring of products in such a 
way that they could not be easily sold to a third party (Williamson, 1975).  This potentially 
leads to the adoption of more arms length relations and reduced coordination by lead firms 
(Nadvi 2008). 
It is in this respect that the literature on platform and standards competition offers 
useful insights into how technological change might impact on power relations in previously 
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relational value chains.  In the ICT Industry, platform and standards competition have been 
particularly influential on the relative power of industry participants (Gawer and Cusumano, 
2008; Tee and Gawer, 2009, page 220).  Within an industry architecture, platforms are 
technologies, products or services that are part of a  ‘system of use ? in which the system 
would be unable to operate without the technology, product or service (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2008). Platforms often play a significant role in influencing the distribution of 
value in an industry architecture (West and Dedrick, 2010). Platforms that acquire significant 
market share achieve lasting economic advantages for the owner of the industry platform. 
In addition, they attract the supply of complementary assets, which in turn supports the 
further growth of the market share of the platform owner. This is what has been described 
ĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ŽĨƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƐ ?ƐƵƐƵŵĂŶŽ ? ? ?  , page 33) explains, a critical feature 
ŽĨĂŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚĐĂŶĐƌĞĂƚĞ ‘ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ?Žƌ ‘positive feedback loops that 
can grow at geometrically increasing rates as adoption of the platform and the 
complements rise ? These network effects include an installed base of users and a wide 
variety of complementary products (Tee and Gawer, 2009).  
 
West and Dedrick (2010) show how NEC's PC-98 was able to sustain a majority 
position in the Japanese PC market for over a decade in part because of the competitive 
advantage derived from its extensive library of custom software applications.  In the ICT 
industry, application software is a key complementary asset to architectural standards.    As 
Teece (1986, page 298) argued, computer hardware typically requires complementary 
specialized assets in the form of software in order to create market value  W  ‘the key to the 
PCs success was not the technology. It was the set of complementary assets which IBM 
either had or quickly assembled around the PC ?. The development of a library of applications 
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software was possible because IBM adopted an open system architecture rather than 
seeking to develop its own proprietary software library (Cusumano, 2010; Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2008; Teece, 1986).  
 
In the ICT industry, the standardized information system or operating system (OS) is the 
platform or base technology and the application programming interfaces (APIs) are the rules 
that determine the interaction between software and the underlying platform or OS (West 
and Dedrick, 2010, page  ? ? ? ) ?  Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ ƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵ ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ǁŝůů ĚĞƉĞŶĚ ŝŶ
part on it being able to control the APIs which can act as an important barrier to 
competition (West and Dedrick, 2010). Much of the value of ICT systems arises from end-
user capability to demand unique combinations of modular components. Through the 
contributions of a multitude of complementors, a diverse product is created that is able to 
satisfy the demands of a range of customers (Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997). As such, it is the 
ecosystem that surrounds the platform technology, rather than the technology itself, which 
explains the ultimate success of technological innovation. As Gawer and Cusumano (2008, 
page 28) and Cusumano (2010) explain, platform success depends on meeting both  
technological challenges and business challenges, with the latter involving the development 
of incentives for complementors to develop innovations that further build the market 
advantage of the platform and improve its competitiveness relative to other platforms.  
 
Jacobides et al (2006) extend these arguments to the concept of the industry 
architecture, which describes the division of activities or roles amongst different types of 
industry actors and the rules that guide their interaction. This approach suggests that  value 
is captured in bottlenecks, which are the segments of a value chain in which there is a 
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relatively low level of competition and in which the products or services of a particular firm 
are difficult to replace or replicate. Jacobides et al (2006) argue that firms can extract the 
ŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚ ǀĂůƵĞ ĨƌŽŵ Ă ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ Žƌ ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞǇ ŵĂŶĂŐĞ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ?Ɛ
architecture so that they become the bottlenecks for the industry. This occurs by ensuring 
high levels of mobility (or competition) in complementary assets (those assets that are 
tailored to their own), through, for example, the reduction of barriers to entry through 
standardization. At the same time, lead firms must retain low levels of mobility or 
competition in their own assets by establishing barriers to mobility.  
Utilizing an industry architecture framework, Tee and Gawer (2010) show how NTT 
DoCoMo (a Japanese operator) failed to establish their mobile internet platform (imode) in 
the European market. The imode is an operator centric mobile internet model, which 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƉƉůĞ ?Ɛ ŝWŚŽŶĞ, which offers a device centre mobile internet model. The 
operator centric imode device succeeded well in Japan in which the regulatory framework 
advantaged operators by restricting competition in the operator segment of the market. 
The failure to successfully introduce the imode in the European market can be explained by 
the industry architecture in Europe, in which device manufacturers such as Nokia, held 
positions of power relative to both operators and developers. In the Netherlands, handset 
manufacturers were in a relatively strong bargaining position because the success of the 
GSM standard intensified competition amongst operators. These different industry 
architectures prevented KPN in the Netherlands from building a platform ecosystem of 
devices and applications to support the imode operator focused technology. In summary, it 
would therefore seem that industry architectures favor industry segments in which there is 
ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŐŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƚŝŵĞ  ‘ĨĞƌŽĐŝŽƵƐ ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ
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complementary segments (which are tailored to each other) (Jacobides et al, 2006; Tee and 
Gawer, 2009). 
This paper shows that while technological change in the games industry has resulted 
in the emergence of new industry segments based on transactional rather than relational 
forms of economic coordination, in which we might therefore expect less asymmetrical 
power relations, lead firms retain a position of power in the global games entertainment 
industry relative to remote developers. This has been possible because lead firms in the 
emerging mobile devices market have developed and sustained bottlenecks in their 
segment of the industry through platform competition and the development of an intensely 
competitive ecosystem of developers. Our research shows the critical role of platform 
competition and bottlenecks in influencing power asymmetries within global markets.  
METHOD 
We utilized two main data sources for this research. The first was a variety of on-line 
gaming magazines and games industry web-sites that report industry news, trends and 
developments and which are cited throughout the paper. The second source of data was 
thirty-three semi-structured interviews conducted with firm managers and employees in a 
variety of firms of different sizes and participating in the mobile and/or console industry 
segments in the Australian games developer industry. One representative from the 
Queensland State Government with extensive knowledge of the games industry was also 
interviewed. We conducted primary interviews with thirteen games development firms, 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁŝŶŐ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌŵƐ ? founder or current owner/manager. Interviews with firm 
owners or managers were conducted in June 2010. As shown in Table 1, firms were selected 
that differed with respect to their market segment focus (console, mobile or both), age, 
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number of employees, and ownership (domestic only versus international ownership). Five 
of these interviews were in Brisbane and nine were in Melbourne.  
Insert Table 1 Here 
 
We also conducted twenty secondary semi-structured interviews (9 in Brisbane and 
11 in Melbourne) with games developers who work in the games industry, which are cited 
below with the prefix E- prior to the code.  (See Table 2 for sample characteristics and 
interview codes). The developers experience working in the industry ranged from 1 to 20 
years, with an average of 7 years. Three of the more experienced developers had experience 
working internationally in the games industry. In terms of their current employment, 11 
worked in firms developing games solely for consoles, 2 worked in firms focused solely for 
mobile games, and the remaining 7 worked in firms developing for both segments. 
Interviews with employees were conducted in November 2010    
Insert Table 2 here 
Interviews with firm owners were wide ranging and covered the range of issues 
necessary to maƉ ĨŝƌŵƐ ? ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŐůŽďĂů ǀĂůƵĞ ĐŚĂŝŶ ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ
transactions and relationships in the GVC. We asked interviewees to identify relations within 
the GVC at the stages from conception to ultimate consumption of a product and including 
issues associated with financing, design, production, and distribution. Interviewees were 
also asked to describe the nature of contracts and informal connections between firms in 
the value chain, the extent to which firms had power to negotiate to capture additional 
revenues, and the extent to which firms were able to switch between partners. Finally 
questions sought to elicit information on the complexity of transactions and ability to codify 
transactions. The interviews with developers working in the industry were also wide 
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ranging, and many of the questions focused on additional issues affecting  the nature of 
work not of direct relevance to this paper. Relevant questions included in the interviews 
concerned changes in the games industry, and the reasons why working conditions within 
the industry had changed over time. Given their often extensive experience, these 
interviews provided substantial historical context to the findings reported in this paper. 
Once we achieved a high convergence of responses we ceased interviews (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990).  
Interviews lasted for between one and 1½ hours and were recorded and fully 
transcribed.  The first step of the analysis was to conduct open coding of the interviews 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Coding was conducted on segments of 
the transcripts that formed identifiable ideas, with each segment often coded into multiple 
categories. The categories and themes identified were theoretically informed by GVC 
related concepts concerning the structure of chain connections, characteristics of  
transactions, including  their complexity and codifiability, and power relations and partner 
switching ability, as well as market segments in which work was conducted and the type of 
(e.g., publishers) or specific actors (e.g., Apple) with which transactions occurred.   A form of 
axial coding (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Corbin and Strauss, 1990) was then conducted which 
paid particular attention to the dominant relationships between console and iPhone game 
developers on the one hand, and publishers, Apple and other actors within the value chain 
on the other.  
The following discussion separately reports a global value chain analysis for each of 
the console and mobile games segments of the industry.  
 
AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPERS IN THE CONSOLE VIDEO GAMES INDUSTRY 
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Industry overview 
Until the 00s, Australia had a small but relatively healthy games industry with 50 
developers and over 2000 employees (1998 figures in ACMI, 2008). In recent years, a large 
number of development studios in the Australian industry have either been acquired by US 
publishers or have been closed (E-Console-Dom 6), which reflects the trend towards 
increasing concentration in the industry more generally (Johns, 2006; Kerr, 2006; Martin and 
Deuze, 2009).  Some of the larger developers in the Australian industry in recent years have 
been THQ Studio Oz (a foreign multinational corporation), Halfbrick Studios, Big Ant Studios, 
2K Martin, Creative Assembly and Team Bondi.  Krome Studios closed in 2010, but was until 
that time the largest employer in the Australian industry with over 350 employees operating 
in Melbourne, Adelaide and Brisbane. Other studios to close since the global financial crisis 
(GFC) include Transmission Games, Fuzzyeyes and Auran. THQ closed its Brisbane and 
Melbourne Studios in 2011 (Launay, 2012).  Team Bondi, KMM and Electronic Arts Studio 
and Visceral Games have also recently ceased operations (Radd, 2011). Halfbrick is now 
ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?ƐůĂƌŐĞƐƚŐĂŵĞƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞƌǁŝƚŚ ? ?ĞŵƉůŽyees (Sakuraoka-Gilman, 2011).  
It is clear from industry trends that the global financial crisis and increasing value of 
the AUD has created challenges for the production of AAA titles for the traditional console 
market (McMillen, 2011).  The dominant business model in the Australian games industry is 
that of the second-party developer (Kerr, 2006), which involves the development of small 
ůŝĐĞŶƐĞĚ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?Ɛ Žƌ ƐƉŽƌƚƐ ŐĂŵĞƐ ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ  ?Žůǁŝůů ?  ? ? ? ? ?E-
Console-Int 1). This is because Australian studios are small by international standards and 
small studios do not have the resources required to develop games, which take more than 
twelve months and involve very large production budgets, without publisher financing 
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(Martin and Deuze, 2009, page 283).  Games development budgets are now as high as 
$US50 million with an average multiplatform development budget sitting between 18 and 
28 million (Crossley, 2012). It is only the large developers that have the financial capacity to 
fund the technical development that supports grand titles based on original ideas, which 
invariably have very large production budgets (Martin and Deuze, 2009, page 283).  
As such, Australian firms are dependent on publishers and license holders to finance 
their operations. Publishers finance developers to create games and make periodic 
advances to developers throughout the development process in accordance with specific 
timelines. Publishers assume responsibility for manufacturing (through relations with 
console manufacturers), marketing and distribution of the game product. Publishers are also 
intermediaries between developers and license holders who negotiate with publishers to 
create games according to specific guidelines typically connected to cinematic releases 
(Megamind), cartoon characters (Scooby-Doo) or toy ranges (Barbie). Johns (2006) has 
shown that publishers are heavily concentrated in Western Europe, USA and Japan with the 
top 14 publishers located in France, USA and Japan. As such, Australian firms are spatially 
remote from the centre of publishing and as will be shown below, they also have a marginal 
position in relational networks in the global console games industry. 
 
Spatial and relational dimensions of economic coordination for Australian developers 
 
As Johns (2006) has shown, the games industry is highly concentrated in three major 
economic regions in Western Europe, Japan and the USA with the key publishers mostly 
located in the USA and Japan (page 166). As such, Australian development firms are spatially 
remote from the key centre of economic activity. Further, our data shows that the spatial 
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remoteness of Australian development firms renders it difficult for them to achieve a 
central position in the games global production network, given the already marginal position 
of development firms in those networks:   ‘ QĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞƌƐĂƌĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ŝƐŽůĂƚĞĚ ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ
network connectivity, occupying a more peripheral position than the console manufacturers 
and publishers, Consequently, they are often in a weak negotiating position and are unable 
to capture extra value ? (Johns, 2006, page 169). 
In Australia, THQ Studio Oz, which closed in 2011, was the only publisher to engage 
Australian developers in the creation of games. Sega previously had ownership in the 
Australian studio Creative Assembly, which it financed to develop games, but Sega appears 
to be gradually withdrawing from the Australian development market (Souri, 2012). As such, 
Australian developers now rely on overseas publishers and license holders, predominantly 
located in the USA. The GFC has meant that USA publishers and license holders have tended 
to commit their work to USA based developers or in-house studios (Schroeder, 2010), which 
has created major problems for the Australian industry. 
As such, the Australian industry has come to rely solely on the development of 
relations with predominantly USA publishers. Gereffi et al (2005) have noted that trans-
national firms coordinate global distributed networks in relational value chains through 
 ‘ƌĞƉĞĂƚƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůŶŽƌŵƐ ? ?Ɖage 81). These have been shown to be 
critical characteristics of the creative industries generally (Hesmodhalgh, 2002) but also 
specifically in relation to games (Johns, 2006; Martin and Deuze, 2009; Yoon and Malecki, 
2009). The need to build reputation and trust with transnational firms is a major barrier to 
entry for small firms in the entertainment industry, particularly those that are remote from 
the major regional centers of activity (Parker and Cox, 2012). A central strategic problem for 
content providers is therefore how to capture value in a market dominated by a small 
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number of powerful coordinators of global distribution, located in markets in Japan, Europe 
and the USA (Johns, 2006), who rely on reputation and trust through prior transactions as 
the basis for allocating work (Scott, 2006). In GVCs in which relational coordination 
mechanisms are important, as with the console games industry, co-location and clustering 
are typically the basis for intense communication and information exchange between firms 
(Sturgeon, 2009), creating further problems for spatially remote SME developers in Australia 
trying to connect to the global market:  
 
 ‘/ƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚďĞŝŶŐŝŶƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂƚo be able to be constantly under the 
ŶŽƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ŐƵǇƐ ŝŶ ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ h< ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŵŽŶĞǇ ŝƐ ? /ƚ ?Ɛ ŶŽƚ ƌĞĂůůǇ Ă
ŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨũƵƐƚŵĂŬŝŶŐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝƚ ?ƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨĚĞǀ ůŽƉŝŶŐĂƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ?Multi-
Dom 5)  ? 
 
The formation of these relationships depends on reputation of a firm for successful 
completion, which takes years for a firm to establish and which ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ  ‘ƉŽŝŶƚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
ďŽĂƌĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĞǆĞĐƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůƉƌŝŽƌŐĂŵĞƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ?Multi-Dom 
5). This is necessary for publishers to have the confidence that they can deliver on a project. 
/ƚ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝƚ ?Ɛ Ă ƉƌĞƚƚǇ ŵĂƐƐŝǀĞ ďĂƌƌŝĞƌ ?  ?Multi-Dom 4) for new firms entering the 
market. Ɛ ƚŚĞ ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂŶ ĨŝƌŵƐ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ? ƚŚĞ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞƌƐ ? ƚƌƵƐƚ ŝŶ ƐƵƉƉůŝĞƌ
capabilities is a challenge for developers that are geographically remote from the centre of 
activity of key publishers and console manufacturers and which are not part of the existing 
relational networks that comprise the industry.  This fits with elements of the concept of 
relational global value chains, in which publishers will not enter into relations with firms that 
they do not trust to deliver a quality product on time and within budget (Gereffi et al, 2005, 
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page 81). The relational value chain involving close ties and deep repeat relations between 
firms, creates challenges for firms that lack network centrality (Johns, 2006) and that are 
spatially remote from the centre of economic activity in the industry in the USA, Japan and 
Europe. The remainder of the paper seeks to determine whether technological change and 
the development of standards in the mobile devices component of the game industry has 
altered industry power relations and forms of economic coordination from the point of view 
of developers.  
 
AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPERS IN THE MOBILE DEVICES SEGMENT OF THE GAMES INDUSTRY 
 
Global industry overview 
 
An increasing number of Australian developers are targeting the mobile device markets, 
especially given the closure of studios in Australia that focused on the console and handheld 
device market as described above. However, given the pace of change in the industry, and 
the tendency for firms to move rapidly in and out of the mobile games development 
business, it is difficult to provide a complete industry profile. The key emerging markets in 
the games industry are based on wireless mobile device platforms and sold through online 
Apps stores (Google Play (Android), Apple App Store, Windows Phone 7 Marketplace, 
BlackBerry App World and Nokia Ovi Store). ƉƉůĞ ?Ɛ ŝK^ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŽƉĞƌĂtes the iPod, iPhone 
and iPad is in utilization in over 120 million devices.  The Apple AppStore currently houses 
over 300 000 titles and has recorded over 10 billion downloads (Raby, 2010; Ziegler, 2011). 
There is massive competition in the development market for mobile devices, with an 
estimated 1000 apps uploaded to the Apple AppStore daily (Slattery, 2010).The total market 
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is estimated to be worth $US 1.8 billion in 2010 (Jennings, 2011). An increasing number of 
Australian firms are seeking to capture a share of this growing market.  
 
 The emergence of the mobile games industry has created new opportunities for 
small developers in the Australian industry, particularly given difficulties in accessing the 
relational console global value chain in which key publishers and console manufacturers are 
both relationally and geographically remote. Mobile devices require new types of games to 
be developed;  games that are less complex and are faster to play and which are suitable for 
casual gamers rather than the more established gamers who invest in the console market. 
This has had the effect of reducing the cost of producing a game as well as expanding the 
market for games, creating new market opportunities for small independent developers 
(Bustamante, 2004; Martin and Deuze, 2009).  Further, the direct access to market created 
through on-line retail stores has reduced the dependence of developers on intermediary 
publishers for access to markets, reducing the role of reputation as a barrier to participation 
in global markets. The creation of arms length relations with on-line distributors for mobile 
devices has opened access to the game market for many firms that were closed out of the 
console value chain. The lower cost of production associated with the development of 
simple and fast games has reduced the dependence of developers on publishers to finance 
their development costs, something that has also defined the console games market (Johns, 
2006).   
 
Drawing on prior literature on platform and standards competition in the ICT 
industry, we are able to show how Apple has developed a position of power relative to 
mobile games developers by first, establishing a technological advance in the form of the 
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iPhone platform and controlling access to that platform through its proprietary standard, 
second by supporting the development of an ecosystem of developers with easy access to 
its standard and thereby developing a large number and large variety of complementors to 
its platform and third by developing brand equity through its control over distribution and 
mobilizing its reputation in the iTƵŶĞƐŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƉƉůĞ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĂƚ
market relative to developers can be attributed to its adoption of several of the key 
strategies for achieving platform leadership. Gawer and Cusumano argue (2010, page 32) 
that firms seeking to compete in a platform and standards war need to build 
complementors by  ‘broadly licensing their IP ?, investing in  ‘brand equity ?, and gaining some 
control over  ‘distribution or service capabilities to signal support for the platform ?. Apple 
has done all of these things and it helps to explain its power in the smartphone market. 
 
Establishing a platform technology and ecosystem 
 
In 2007, Apple released the iPhone on to the market, challenging a number of the 
practices of wireless carriers or operators, building its strength within the broader industry 
architecture. Prior to the launch of iPhone, manufacturers developed devices that met the 
specifications of operators and contained operator/carrier specific content2 ?ƉƉůĞ ?ƐŝWŚŽŶĞ
ďƌŽŬĞƚŚĞĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĐĂƌƌŝĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌ ?ƉƉůĞ ?ƐƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵĚĞǀŝĐĞ
contained the operating system iOS which contained the proprietary application 
programming interface (API), which Apple subsequently ůŝĐĞŶƐĞĚƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞƌƐ ?ƉƉůĞ ?ƐŝK^
thereby became the standard for developers seeking to develop applications for the iPhone. 
In the US, prior to the launch of Apple iPhone, device manufacturers had to develop 
                                                 
2
 This analysis relates to the USA, Australian and European markets; different power relations operated in the 
Japanese market (Kenney and Pon 2011; Tee and Gawer 2009) 
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handsets that met the demands of carriers, who in turn provided unique content and 
applications that distinguished their phone in the market (Kenney and Pon, 2011; 
FierceWireless, 2012). By changing these arrangements, Apple secured a powerful starting 
position in the mobile internet or smartphone industry architecture. 
 
Once its platform was offered in the market, Apple intensified its position of power 
by developing intense competition in an ecosystem of complementors or application 
developers who produced a large number and variety of applications that appealed to a 
large user base, ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶ ƚƵƌŶ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ ƉƉůĞ ?Ɛ ŝWŚŽŶĞ ĚĞǀŝĐĞ ?
(typically referred to as network effects) (Cusumano, 2010). Apple has made access to its 
iOS widely available. Apple is paid a fee of $US99 per year by developers in return for which 
the developer is given a software development kit and is permitted to release unlimited 
titles on the App store.  The developers develop their game idea and test it using the 
software development kit and it is submitted to Apple for approval after which it is available 
for purchase in the Apple store. As such, unlike the relationship between publishers and 
developers in the console market, there is no necessary cooperation between Apple and the 
developers. These arrangements have had a significant impact on barriers to entry for 
games development firms; starting-up in the wireless device market is easy in the sense that 
there are limited overheads. This stands in contrast to the console market in which there 
are high costs associated with acquiring and testing hardware and obtaining a security 
ƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ Ĩŝƌŵ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐ  ?:ŽŚŶƐ, 2006; Kerr, 2006). For the wireless device 
market, the initial start-up costs involve purchase of an iPod or iPhone and a MAC, providing 
games developers with the tools to develop a very small Apple game within a matter of 
weeks (Mobile Dom 1).  
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 ‘All your entry costs are pretty much negĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ŝWŚŽŶĞ QǇŽƵ ĐĂŶ ũƵƐƚ
ĐƌĞĂƚĞǇŽƵƌŽǁŶƉƌŽĚƵĐƚĂŶĚƉƉůĞǁŝůůƌĞůĞĂƐĞŝƚ ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƐƚŽƌĞ QǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽ
spend any money on printing medium, or discs or publishing costs or anything like 
ƚŚĂƚ ?/ƚ ?ƐũƵƐƚƉƉůĞ ?Ɛ ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛŝƚ ?Multi Dom 1).  ? 
 
A consequence of the reduction of barriers to entry is the intensification of 
competition in the development market, particularly for low end games (high quality games 
can take three to six months to develop and require a development firm to have significant 
financial reserves (Mobile-Dom 3)). The result is a large number and variety of 
complementary products that support the iPhone platform, an essential element of success 
in platform competition (Teece, 1986; Cusumano, 2010).  
 
A further element of platform success depends on the development of 
manufacturing and distribution of service capabilities that support the platform technology 
(Gawer and Cusumano,  ? ? ? ? ) ?ƉƉůĞǁĂƐĂďůĞƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨ ‘ƚŝƉƉŝŶŐ ?
whereby it was able to leverage its existing distribution power in the iTunes market by 
moving into retail distribution for its iPhone through the Apple App Store.  As Kenney and 
Pon (2011, page 9) explain  ‘the iPhone success is a typical model of leveraging a previously 
successfully platform, the Apple iPod, with its extant ecosystem, cachet and market 
momentum ƚŽĞŶƚĞƌƚŚĞŵŽƌĞĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?ŵŽďŝůĞƚĞůĞƉŚŽŶǇ ? ?
The Apple App Store (for Apple iPhones and iPads) accounts for a large component 
of the retail sales for the wireless device industry3. Apple takes a commission in the form of 
                                                 
3
 dŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŵŽďŝůĞĚĞǀŝĐĞƐǁŝƚŚŶĚƌŽŝĚƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƐĞǆĐĞĞĚƐƚŚŽƐĞǁŝƚŚƉƉůĞ ?ƐŝK^ ?ƉƉůĞ ?ƐƉƉ^ƚŽƌĞ
remains the largest store in terms of available applications although Google Play (for Android devices) is 
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30% of the sales of any game purchased from its online store. Apple handles the technology, 
provides the interface and service necessary to maintain the web space for games. Apple 
takes 30 percent of in-app purchases (micro-transactions in which gamers can advance their 
progress in the game or receive access to additional characters or enhancements for a 
payment) and revenues generated from advertising (which are provided to developers 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉƉůĞ ?ƐŝĚEĞƚǁŽƌŬ ) ?&ŝĞůĚŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
 
Constraining platform competition 
A critical factor influencing the power of platform holders, such as Apple, is the 
relatively constrained competition in the smartdevice or mobile platform market. Given the 
intense competition in the developer segment, the limited number of smartphone platforms 
on which games can be released and the difficulty for developers in switching between 
ƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƐďĞĐŽŵĞƐƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌƉƉůĞ ?ƐďŽƚtleneck position (Jacobides et al, 2006).  
 
Apple has been accused of seeking to intensify this bottleneck position through its 
control over the programming language of games and the way in which games are coded 
(Gruber, 2010). For example, Unity (a games development tool) makes programming a lot 
easier; it provides a lot of the nuts and bolts in the sense that it encodes a lot of basic 
content for the developer. By using a program such as Unity, developers can focus on the 
game and the content and are not restricted by their sometimes limited programming 
capabilities (Multi-Dom 1 ) ? tŚĞƌĞĂƐ ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƉƉůĞ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ  ?A?A? ) ŵĞĂŶƐ
that it is a lot harder to do basic things. 
                                                                                                                                                        
growing rapidly and is expected to overtake Apple in the near future (Wauters, 2011). Our interviewees 
reported that Australian development firms are focused on the iOS platform. 
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 ‘Basically you have to build a whole system to get to do really simple stuff. 
The existing systems that are around are built to allow people to easily do stuff ? 
(Multi-Dom 1) 
 
A potentially important implication of any attempt to impose a language preference 
on developers is that it restricts the capacity of developers to release a game in other 
formats - the programs such as Unity enable a developer to create applications for multiple 
platforms (Mobile-Dom 2): 
 
 ‘Apple is trying to make its own ecosystem in which developers become 
Apple developers. We are  “Apple developers ?, rather than we are  “developers ?  W we 
are  “game developers ? and suddenly we are  “ƉƉůĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞƌƐ ? ?Mobile-Dom 2)  ?.  
It has been shown in other industries, that restricting the ability of suppliers to 
 ‘ƐǁŝƚĐŚ ? ƚŽ ŽƚŚĞƌ ďƵǇĞƌƐ ŝƐ ĂŶ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ďĂƐŝƐ ĨŽƌ ŵĂŝŶƚaining a position of market 
dominance. As Jacobaides (Jacobaides et al, 2006) explains, firms wishing to benefit from 
innovation or new technology need to seek to maximize competition in their supplier 
market while minimizing competition in their own market, thereby maintaining their 
position as the industry bottleneck.  
Development firms would obviously prefer to be able to produce games that can be 
used in more than one format. 'ŽŽŐůĞ ?Ɛ Android platform is the largest alternative platform. 
However, while the underlying language that an iPhone game is written in can be used on 
Android, it does not produce as good a result as if the game was developed with the 
functionality of the Android phone in mind: 
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 ‘dŚĞƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ?ƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶŝŶ ? ŝƚĐĂŶďĞŵĂĚĞƚŽǁŽƌŬŽŶƚŚĞ
Android. But iƚ ?ƐĂĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ƚŚŝŶŐƚŽĚŽƚŚĂƚ ?tŚĞŶǇŽƵĚŽ ŝƚ ?ǇŽƵ ů se some of the 
ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ŽĨĨĞƌĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŶĚƌŽŝĚ ƉŚŽŶĞ ? dŽ ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŚĂƚ
ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ǇŽƵ ?ǀĞ ŐŽƚ ƚŽ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ƵƐĞ ŝƚƐ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ? Kƌ ǇŽƵ ?ǀĞ ŐŽƚ ƚŽ ĚŽ ďŝŐ
workarounds to get it to work and stuff like that ?.  (Mobile-Dom 3). 
One of the reasons Australian developers appear to prefer Apple is because Apple 
users adopt new versions of the operating system (OS) much more quickly than Android 
users. As a consequence, the Android market has much more fragmented operating 
systems, which is difficult for developers who have to ensure their game is compatible with 
a range of operating systems. As Panzarion (2012) notes:   
Unfortunately, only a fraction of Android devices are on the latest version of 
the OS, which makes it difficult for developers, especially those with limited 
resources, to create versions of their apps that work appropriately across all devices. 
It also makes it difficult for them to adopt the coolest new features of Android very 
quickly, as they must make sure that their apps work on the most common version 
of Android, even if it is far older and not as well equipped. 
However, in order to mitigate the risk of committing to one platform, developers are 
considering other emerging opportunities. Massively multiplayer online role playing games 
(MMORPGS) are a growing niche market. Two of the large  games are World of Warcraft, 
which has subscriptions of around 10 million and Call of Duty Elite with around 7 million 
registered players (Activision, 2012). Australian developers are not involved in this market, 
which is dominated by large USA studios. While Australian studios have not previously been 
involved in the development of games for Facebook¸ it is possible that social media might 
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provide an opportunity for Australian developers in the future. Halfbrick, currently 
ƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂ ?ƐůĂƌŐĞƐƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞƌ ?ŚĂƐƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇĂĐƋƵŝƌĞĚKŶĂ 'ĂŵĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŽǁŶƐƚŚĞDĂŶĚƌĞĞů
Technology, which enables access to platforms such as Facebook and others using HTML5 or 
open web platforms (Constine, 2012). It would also seem that Facebook and others are 
using open standards HTML5 for mobile web and the native applications developed for iOS 
 ?ƉƉůĞ ?Ɛ KƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ^ǇƐƚĞŵ ) ? ŶĚƌŽŝĚ  ?'ŽŽŐůĞ WŚŽŶĞ ) ĂŶĚ tŝ ĚŽǁƐ WŚŽŶĞ ? ,dD> ? ŝƐ
considered technologically inferior at this point (slower and poorer functionality), however 
that might be a function of time as HTLM5 develops further technological sophistication 
(Kosner, 2012). In Australia, Halfbrick has already released both Fruit Ninja and Jetpack 
Joyride ƚŽ &ĂĐĞďŽŽŬ ? Ɛ  ? ? ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ ŽĨ &ĂĐĞďŽŽŬ ?Ɛ ĂŶŶƵĂů ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞ ŝƐ ĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĂďůĞ ƚŽ
cooperative multiplayer games (Indvik, 2012), this might constitute a lucrative market for 
games developers in the future. However, even if the number of games platforms increases, 
intensifying competition in the retail end of the market, it remains the case that a small 
number of large corporations will control the retail end of the games market while access to 
games development remains open with low barriers to entry in the production of mobile 
games.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has explicated the nature of power relations in two segments of the 
global games industry from the point of view of remote games developers in Australia. 
Australian firms in the console games market are operating on the margins of relational 
value chains in the sense that they lack network centrality (Johns, 2006) and are spatially 
remote from the centre of economic activity in the industry in the USA, Japan and Europe. 
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Our research shows that relational value chains are not always characterized by more equal 
power relations than those typical of captive value chains (Gereffi et al, 2005; Sturgeon, 
2006) because the power of lead firms can be elevated by their bottleneck position in highly 
concentrated industry segments (Jacobides et al, 2006; Pisano and Teece, 2007). 
Further, direct access to consumer markets facilitated through on-line distribution 
methods has not eroded power asymmetries from the point of view of remote developers. 
Instead, technological changes associated with the development of mobile internet devices 
have been manipulated by different lead firms to ensure their dominance in much the same 
way as lead firms in the console segment of the market. As such developers are price takers 
in the on-line market who bear all of the risk of development. The mobile market looks 
more like a market than a relational value chain, in which we would therefore expect 
reduced asymmetries of power according to GVC analysis (Gereffi et al, 2005; Sturgeon, 
2009). However, the limited competition amongst platform providers and intense 
competition amongst developers renders developers in an equally vulnerable negotiating 
position to that which they have in the console market.  
A further notable difference in the two segments of the market concerns the 
independence of the game developer during the process of development, something that 
can be very constrained in the console market in which publishers are proactive in the 
development stage of games for which they are financing development (Kerr, 2006; Martin 
and Deuze, 2009). In contrast, in the mobile devices market, development firms remain 
independent during the development process.  While developers have a great deal of 
autonomy as to which market for which they produce their game and have the option of 
producing multi-platform games, resource costs can be prohibitive of multi-platform 
development for newly emerging firms.  
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These trends suggest that developers occupy weak positions in the mobile games 
value chain compared with lead firms that control access to mobile device platforms and 
online retail distribution. Although the mobile games industry has features of arms-length 
transactional forms of economic coordination, the high level of concentration in the 
platform and retail end of the market ensures that the power asymmetries between large 
multinational corporations and developers remain unfavorable to the latter.  This can be 
explained in part by the intense competition in the development end of the market and the 
very limited competition in retail and mobile device platforms.  Our research therefore 
shows that technological change and the development of standards do not necessarily 
result in arms-length transactional forms of market exchange involving more equal power 
relations (Gereffi et al, 2005; Sturgeon, 2002). Instead, the development of standards can be 
manipulated by lead firms to ensure their position of power even in industries in which 
transactional forms of economic coordination prevail (Nadvi, 2004; 2008).  
The main theoretical contribution of the paper is to amplify our understanding of the 
critical role of bottlenecks and platform leadership in moderating the influence of global 
value chain characteristics on power asymmetries. Global value chain analysis provides a 
useful framework for understanding how the console and mobile segments of the games 
industry differ in terms of the complexity of transactions and the codifiability of information, 
and to some extent the capabilities in the supply base (in the sense that the development of 
mobile games requires much lower level capabilities and resource investment than console 
games), and therefore the nature of economic coordination (Gereffi et al, 2005). However, it 
is the similarity in the two segments of the industry in terms of the high levels of market 
concentration amongst console/publishers and platform providers/online retailers that is 
important in understanding the nature of power relations and capacity of firms to capture 
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value. As we would expect, the transactional nature of relations in the mobile segment of 
the market means developers have fewer challenges associated with their geographical 
distance from the main buyers than do developers in the console market. However, as the 
mobile games market is highly concentrated, like the console segment of the market, power 
remains highly asymmetrical in both segments of the global games industry.  
Our research also has practice implications for the industry and for small firm 
developers. The advantage small firms have acquired through their direct access to 
consumer markets associated with on-line distribution comes with a cost in that they must 
now accept the risk associated with the development of their games, a risk that publishers 
assume in the console market when they finance games development. While this means 
potentially high returns for developers, it also means that developers have to bear the costs 
for the very large number of games that will never succeed in the on-line market. Reduced 
barriers to consumer markets have resulted in on-line retail stores being stocked with 
potential hits hidden amongst a large number of low quality games. As the CEO of Eye 
Interactive and P4RC notes,  ‘Profitability is elusive for the vast majority of developers. 
Unless you are part of the anointed few that Apple selects to push heavily in the App Store, 
revenue is hard to come by  ? (Fieldman, 2012).   
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Table 1: Characteristics of Games Developer Firms Interviewed 
 
Codea Firm Size Age Of Firm 
in 2010 
Platform Firm 
Ownership 
Console-Dom 1 117 3 Console Domestic 
Mobile-Dom 1 1 + 
contractors 
2 iPhone Domestic 
Multi-Dom 1 <10 8 Both Domestic 
Multi-Dom 2 1 + 
contractors 
9 Both Domestic 
Console-Int 1 98 + 13 
contractors 
16 Console International 
Multi-Int 1 150 10 Both International 
Mobile-Dom 2 2 + 
contractors 
2 iPhone Domestic 
Multi-Dom 3 50-60 18 Both Domestic 
Console-Dom 2 40-60 16 Console Domestic 
Multi-Dom 4 12 11 Both Domestic 
Mobile-Dom 3 3 + 6 
contractors 
1 iPhone Domestic 
Multi-Dom 5 8 + 2 
contractors 
7 Both Domestic 
Console-Dom 3 1 10 Console Domestic 
Notes. a The parts of the code for each interview refer to: Console = works in console games 
segment only; Mobile = works in mobile games segment only; Multi = works in both console 
and mobile games segments; Dom = Domestic firm; Int = International firm.    
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Table 2: Characteristics of Games Developers Interviewed and Characteristics of the Firm of 
their Current  Employment 
 
Interview 
Codea 
Years 
Experience 
In Industry 
Working 
Experience 
Firm Size Age Of 
Firm in 
2010 
Firm 
Platform 
Firm 
Ownership 
Firm Role 
E-Mobile-
Dom 1 
4 Domestic  3 + 6 
contractors 
1 iPhone Domestic Developer 
E-Mobile-
Dom 2 
4 Domestic  3 + 6 
contractors 
0 iPhone Domestic Developer 
E-Console-
Dom 3 
20 Domestic  10 7 Console Domestic Developer 
E-Console-
Dom 4 
5 Domestic  60 9 Console Domestic Developer 
E-Console-
Dom 5 
11 Internation
al  
60 8 Console Domestic Developer 
E-Console-
Dom 6 
3 Domestic  60 7 Console Domestic Developer 
E-Multi-
Dom 1 
3 Domestic  12 11 Both Domestic Developer 
E-Multi-
Dom 2 
1 Domestic  12 10 Both Domestic Developer 
E-Multi-
Dom 3 
9 Domestic  12 9 Both Domestic Developer 
E-Multi-
Dom 4 
11 Domestic  12 8 Both Domestic Developer 
E-Console-
Int 1 
4.5 Domestic  40-60 16 Console Domestic Developer 
E-Console-
Int-Pub 1 
14 Domestic  >100 7 Console Internation
al 
Publisher 
E-Console-
Int 2 
7 Internation
al  
60 10 Console Internation
al 
Developer 
E-Console-
Int 2 
14 Domestic  >100 6 Console Internation
al 
Publisher 
E-Console-
Int-Pub 2 
8 Domestic  >100 5 Console Internation
al 
Publisher 
E-Console-
Int-Pub 3 
3 Domestic  >100 4 Console Internation
al 
Publisher 
E-Console-
Int-Pub 4 
6 Domestic  >100 3 Console Internation
al 
Publisher 
E-Multi-
Dom 5 
2 Domestic  60 9 Both Domestic Developer 
E-Multi-
Dom 6 
1 Domestic  60 8 Both Domestic Developer 
E-Multi-
Dom 7 
11 Internation
al  
60 7 Both Domestic Developer 
Notes. a The parts of the code for each interview refer to: Console = works in console games 
segment only; Mobile = works in mobile games segment only; Multi = works in both console 
and mobile games segments; Dom = Domestic firm; Int = International firm; Pub = Publisher.   
